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made to the WTO dispute resolution system. The lack of standing for private parties to raise a
claim before the WTO dispute resolution system means there are many potential international
trade dispute claims that are never resolved. Private counsel representation and submission of
amicus brief by private parties acknowledge that WTO are realizing the efficacy of private
interests in international trade matters. These changes, however, are not sufficient for private
parties to protect their interests unless the ability to initiate dispute before the WTO is granted to
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I. INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization (WTO), which officially came into existence on January 1,
1995, was the culmination of trade negotiations that had lasted nearly a decade.1

With the

WTO’s creation, new trade agreements were made which reduced tariffs and other trade barriers
to lower levels than ever before.2

As the first international organization with the responsibility

of overseeing the world trading system3 and more than 140 member states,4 the WTO system
applies to over $6 trillion, or about 90 percent, of international trade in goods and service per
year.5
One of the most significant changes made by the WTO was the creation of a new procedure
for resolving trade disputes. Because of the peculiar history6 of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade7 (GATT), the GATT dispute resolution system was primarily developed in an
ad hoc, disorganized fashion.

As a result, the system was extremely susceptible to political

1

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Charter].
2
See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 295, 296 (1996) [hereinafter Nichols, Extension of Standing].
3
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE LAUNCH OF THE WTO: SIGNIFICANCE & CHALLENGES, IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 5, 10- 11 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter JACKSON, URUGUAY ROUND].
4
See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Current WTO members (As of February 25, 2004, 146
states, including most of the industrialized world, were members of the WTO.), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.
5
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH,
779 (2002).
6
See infra text accompanying notes 23-48.
7
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
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gamesmanship and diplomatic power struggles among states.

The outcomes of trade disputes

were affected by the unpredictability of international relations, instead of a fair and impartial
interpretation of the underlying treaties.8
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,9 an
annex to the WTO Charter, made a major improvement over the GATT dispute resolution system.
It greatly diminished the ability of large states to use their power to derail the dispute resolution
process and advanced the WTO’s stated goal of “providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system.”10

Under the WTO system, the outcome of trade disputes is less

dependent on the power of the states involved and more dependent on a fair and logical
application of the trade agreements.
The WTO dispute resolution system is so important that the former Director General has
called it “the central pillar of the multilateral trading system and the WTO’s most individual
contributions to the stability of the global economy.”11

It differs not only from dispute handling

within the GATT, but in fact from most previous dispute settlement mechanisms at an
international level in that it has moved from the traditional power based dispute resolution
toward the new rule based dispute resolution.12

Since its operation, the WTO dispute resolution

8

Glen T. Schleyer, Power to The People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims before The WTO Dispute
Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2276 (April, 1997).
9
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
10
Id. art. 3(2).
11
Former Director General Renato Ruggiero, WTO News: 1995-99 Speeches, Address to the Korean Business
Association, (Apr. 17, 1997) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/seoul_e.htm).
12
Lawrence D. Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a Just Mechanism for WTO Dispute
Resolution, 40 AM.BUS.L.J. 511, 512 (Spring 2003).
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system has been very busy; more than 80 cases were filed in the first two years and more than
300 cases had been filed up to now.13
Notwithstanding its success, however, the WTO dispute resolution system has been
criticized for its inability to reflect the needs and concerns of the citizens of WTO member states
because it does not allow private parties to seek resolution of international trade disputes.

Also,

political motivations and diplomatic gamesmanship can still exist in the WTO dispute resolution
system14 because the WTO provision allows only states to challenge illegal trade practices.15
Under the WTO dispute resolution system, the initial filing of a dispute and its continuation are
affected by political motivations and international relations, instead of the merits of a claim.

No

matter how serious a trade violation is, the illicit trade policy will continue if no government is
willing to take the political risk associated with initiating a dispute.
Under the WTO dispute resolution system, private parties must rely on their governments to
assert and defend their trading rights.

This approach disregards the fact that companies and

individuals are the primary and real actors in international trade and are directly affected by the
decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.16

The lack of rights and standing for private

actors makes the system less responsive to the citizen of member states and less democratic in

13

Dispute Chronologically, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
For example, the United States successfully pressured the European Union to drop the case where the validity of
the Helms-Burton Act was alleged, See David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1997, at A1.
15
See Understanding, supra note 9, art. 3.
16
See SUSAN STRANGE, STATES, FIRMS, AND DIPLOMACY, INT’L AFFAIRS, London, Vol. 68, no.1, (1992).
14
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the end.

Therefore, the legitimacy of the WTO dispute resolution system, which does not allow

access to such key players in international trade, has been questioned.17
If private parties could initiate disputes over the legitimacy of a state’s actions, then a ruling
on the merits would be virtually assured.

Private parties would not be susceptible to political

pressures in the same way as states. Also private parties’ claims would not hurt international
relations because the claims could not be considered as a diplomatic attack or maneuver.18
Despite the importance of states in international law, the notion that only states enjoy rights
and duties directly under international law does not really correspond with the way non-state
actors and states interact because.19

Private parties are the primary and real actors in world

trade today, and it is their investments and efforts that are harmed by illicit trade policies.
Global compliance with trade agreements is essential if the people of the world are to fully reap
the economic benefits of free trade.

The only adequate way to ensure global compliance and

advance the WTO’s goal of providing more stability and predictability to international trade is to
give private parties, not just states, the right to participate in the WTO dispute resolution system.
Since its creation, the WTO has moved slowly in the direction to private party participation
in its dispute resolution system.

The WTO Appellate Body has asserted the right of member

states to include private, non-governmental employees in their trade delegations before the
WTO,20 and has acknowledged the right of private individuals or organizations to submit amicus
17

See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 359 (1996) [hereinafter Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model].
18
Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2277.
19
See DUNOFF, supra note 5, at 191.
20
See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sep. 9, 1997) [hereinafter EU-Bananas].
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briefs in support of their positions in international trade disputes.21

These decisions suggest that

dispute resolution in the WTO may be changing from a solely governmental focus to a broader
one.
Part II of this paper discusses the background of both the GATT and the WTO. This part
examines the formation, history, and philosophy of both the GATT and the WTO, with an
emphasis on their respective dispute resolution systems.

Part III summarizes the competing

political philosophies regarding the development of world trade dispute resolution over the past
fifty years. After reviewing the arguments surrounding the extension of private participation in
the WTO dispute resolution system, this part discusses the benefits that greater private
participation would confer upon the WTO dispute resolution system.

Part IV examines how

private parties can participate in the current WTO dispute resolution system.

This part reviews

whether the WTO Appellate Body decisions are adequate enough to protect private parties’
interests and to achieve WTO objectives.
private participation in the WTO.

Part V examines other possible ways for enhancing

After discussing other international tribunals that allow

private parties to bring suit against a state, this part tries to find the method which is appropriate
to the WTO dispute resolution system.

Finally, Part VI, the conclusion of this paper, examines

whether future concessions permitting further private party access to the WTO can be expected
to the extent that private parties can bring trade disputes before the WTO dispute resolution
system.

21

See WTO Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, at 15-22
(holding that amicus briefs may now be sent directly to the WTO without attachment to members' submissions).
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtles].
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II. BACKGROUND

The current world trade system has its roots in the years immediately following World War
II, when Western states agreed that international trade frameworks were necessary to support
individual national economies and the global economy as a whole, and reduce the possibility of
another massive armed conflict.22

An analysis of the history and development of the two major

entities governing world trade, the GATT and the WTO, will help to understand the problems
surrounding the GATT and the WTO dispute resolution systems.

A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

The GATT was originally negotiated in 1947 by twenty-three countries23 as a provisional
trade agreement to lower tariffs in conjunction with the establishment of three global economic
institutions: the International Trade Organization (ITO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).24

This subpart

of the thesis deals with the development and major characteristics of the GATT, as well as the
attributes, advantages, and drawbacks of the GATT dispute resolution system.

22

Roberts, supra note 12, at 513.
JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 5 (1990).
24
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
31-37 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
23
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1. Development of the GATT
The international trade system that emerged after World War II was a part of a new and
broader conception of the international economic order expressed by the Bretton Woods
Agreements.

In June of 1944, representatives of the Allied states met in Bretton Woods, New

Hampshire.25

Near the end of World War II, these states recognized the need to address the

financial and economic problems that had contributed to the Great Depression and World War
II. 26

Because the Bretton Woods participants were from the finance ministries of their

respective governments, they had established the charters of two major international financial
entities at the end of the Conference - the IMF and the World Bank.27
The Bretton Woods participants also recognized the need for a third international
organization which would supervise the area of world trade.28

The protectionist measures that

had arisen during the two decades between the World Wars had hampered international trade, and
most states felt that this obstruction of free trade was a major factor contributing to the
Depression and the War.29

Shortly after the Bretton Woods Conference, the United States and

25

Representatives of 44 states participated in the Bretton Woods Conference. Richard Myrus, Note, From Bretton
Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and
the European Community, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2096-97 (1994).
26
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24.
27
Id. at 31-32.
28
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 5; Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 388 (1996)
[hereinafter Nichols, GATT Doctrine].
29
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 31; Muquel Montana i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law
Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 106-07
(1993).
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the United Kingdom proposed the creation of the ITO.30

The newly-formed United Nations

was charged with the task of creating a charter for the ITO.31
The states participating in this unprecedented multinational effort, however, were eager to
enjoy the benefits of free trade and did not want to wait for the creation of the ITO.32

As an

interim measure, they decided to draft and enter into a multilateral trade agreement that would
regulate international trade until the ITO could take over.33 This provisional arrangement was
the GATT, and in 1947 the participating states signed a Protocol of Provisional Application,
which put the GATT into force.34
In the meantime, the ITO was running into problems.

The proposed charter for the ITO

was extremely ambitious and set numerous limits on the actions that participating states could
take in international trade.35

As a result, in 1950, the United States Congress, refused to ratify

the ITO charter because of “perceived threats to national sovereignty and the danger of too much
ITO intervention in markets.” 36

Without U.S. participation, the ITO never came into

existence,37 leaving the GATT as the legal structure within which world trade policies would be

30

Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389.
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 5; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389.
32
Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389.
33
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 5-6; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 389.
34
GATT, supra note 7. The states signing the GATT were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon,
Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
35
JACKSON, URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 6.
36
Michael R. Czinkita, Executive Insights: The World Trade Organization - Perspectives and Prospects, 3 J. INT’L
MARKETING 85 (1995).
37
“Because the support of the United States was critical, other countries that were ready to adopt the ITO charter
waited to see its fate in the United State. President Truman submitted the ITO charter to Congress, but the
Republicans won control of Congress in the 1948 election. In 1950, the Truman administration announced that it
would no longer seek congressional approval for the ITO,” MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 2 (2003).
31

8

developed. 38

The demise of the ITO meant, among other things, abandoning the ITO’s

consensus-based dispute resolution system, which included resort to the International Court of
Justice for “advisory opinions”39 and a binding arbitration option outside the ITO for disputing
ITO members.40
As a result, the GATT, which was intended to be merely temporary, became by default the
primary entity governing international trade41 with a number of procedural weaknesses.42

The

mismatch between the GATT’s initial conception and its ultimate function manifested itself in a
number of ways, including the artificial “leasing” of its staff from the non-existent ITO43 and the
lack of any guiding constitution or charter.44
The “birth defect” of the GATT raised the concern that it would not survive the contentious
nature of international trade.45

The GATT, however, proved tremendously beneficial to world

trade over the next fifty years.46

Most importantly, the GATT functioned as the basis of

38

JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 15. The GATT took legal effect through the “Protocol of
Provisional Application,” under which GATT is applied as a treaty obligation under international law. Id. at 13-14.
The Protocol permitted the executive branches of the signing states to implement the GATT without seeking
legislative approval by giving “grandfather rights” to trade legislation existing in 1947 that was inconsistent with the
GATT. Id. at 14. These grandfather rights exist to the present day. Id.
39
ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM & WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 28-30 (2d ed. 1990).
40
Id. at 31 n.18. The ITO Charter provided that such arbitration decisions “shall not be binding for any purpose on
the Organization.” (quoting ITO CHARTER art. 93(2)).
41
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 37; WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 6; Nichols, GATT
Doctrine, supra note 28, at 390.
42
Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 390.
43
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 37.
44
Id. at 38.
45
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833 (1995) [hereinafter Shell, Trade Legalism].
46
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 6.
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ongoing trade negotiations, called “trade rounds,” which resulted in diminished tariffs.47

In

time, the GATT eventually became a de facto international organization.48
2. Obligations Imposed by the GATT
The GATT’s drafters intended it to be instrumental in combating the high tariffs and other
protectionist measures that had contributed to the Great Depression and World War II.49

To this

end, Article II of the GATT prohibits the participating states, called “Contracting Parties,” from
imposing any import restrictions other than tariffs and also limits the tariffs that can be
imposed. 50

Between the adoption of the GATT and its replacement by the WTO, the

Contracting Parties repeatedly lowered the tariff limits referred to in Article II.51

Eventually,

the tariffs reached such low levels as to present no real impediment to free trade.52
In addition to the tariff reductions, the GATT also places limits on the internal laws and
regulations of the Contracting Parties. Specifically, each state’s treatment of imports from
another Contracting Party must satisfy two principles of non-discriminatory treatment set forth

47

JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 52-3; Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the
“Rule of Law,” 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (1985).
48
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 38.
49
Id. at 31. In the Preamble to the GATT, the Contracting Parties manifested their desire to “enter[ ] into reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” GATT, supra note 7, Preamble.
50
GATT, supra note 7, art. II; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 115, 118-19.
51
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 52-3.
52
See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 53; see also Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28,
at 387 (noting that the Contracting Parties anticipated that tariff limits “were to be negotiated down so that
eventually trade among states would be virtually unfettered”).
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by the GATT.

These are referred to as “most-favored-nation treatment” 53 and “national

treatment.”54
Article I of the GATT sets forth the most-favored-nation obligation.55

Under this article,

one Contracting Party cannot be given preferential treatment over another country.

Instead, the

imports from, and exports to, each Contracting Party must be afforded equitable treatment with
respect to customs procedures and all other import- or export-related regulations. In effect,
each state must “grant to every other contracting party the most favorable treatment that it grants
to any country.”56
The second type of non-discrimination is national treatment, set forth in Article III of the
GATT.57

Under this doctrine, the domestic laws of a Contracting Party must treat goods

imported from another Contracting Party no less favorably than comparable domesticallyproduced goods once the goods have entered the domestic market.58
3. GATT Dispute Resolution
The provisional nature of the GATT shaped its dispute resolution processes, which began as
a diplomatic system of dispute settlement and gradually evolved into a rule-oriented but formally
nonbinding arbitration scheme.

From its inception, the development of dispute resolution

mechanisms under the GATT was influenced by the tension between those states desiring a more

53
54
55
56
57
58

GATT, supra note 7, art. I.
Id. art. III.
Id. art. I(1).
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 133; GATT, supra note 7, art. I(1).
GATT, supra note 7, art. III(1)-(2).
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 189; GATT, supra note 7, art. III(1)-(2).
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flexible, negotiation based dispute resolution and those states preferring a rule based dispute
resolution with clear written standards. 59

The provisional nature of the initial agreement

strongly advanced the position of advocates of the diplomatic approach, at least at the outset.60
As negotiated in 1947, GATT contained only a few paragraphs devoted to dispute settlement.
Articles XXII61 and XXIII62 provide only the most cursory guidance for the contracting parties.
The GATT dispute resolution system is triggered when a Contracting Party determines that
a benefit accruing to it under the GATT is being “nullified or impaired” by the actions of another
Contracting Party.63

The GATT requires the states involved to try to resolve the dispute

between themselves before bringing the dispute to the other Contracting Parties.

The first step

the complaining state must take is to “make written representations or proposals” to the state it
believes to be acting in contravention of the GATT.64

The other state must “give sympathetic

consideration” to these representations and proposals.65
If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute themselves, Article XXIII allows the
complaining party to bring the complaint before the other Contracting Parties, who will
investigate and make appropriate recommendations.66

In the early years of the GATT, disputes

59

JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
454 (2000).

60

The GATT always suffered from birth defect, inherent weakness that handicapped its operation. See JOHN. H.
JACKSON, DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, APPRAISAL AND PROSPECTS, IN THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 161, 163 (Anne O.
Krueger ed., 1998).
61
GATT, supra note 7, art. XXII.
62
Id. art. XXIII.
63
GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1); JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 94; Nichols, GATT
Doctrine, supra note 28, at 392.
64
GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1).
65
Id.
66
Id. art. XXIII(2).
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were taken up at a meeting of all the Contracting Parties.67

Because this proved too inefficient

and time-consuming for most disputes, the Contracting Parties developed an alternate method,
under which a working party would investigate the dispute and make a recommendation.68

The

working party generally consisted of representatives of the disputing countries and of a few
neutral countries.69
In 1955, however, the GATT Secretariat established dispute resolution panels of three to
five experts to act as independent arbitrators to facilitate dispute resolution.

The GATT used

this general arbitration framework for dispute resolution until the WTO came into existence in
1995. 70

Between 1955 and 1995, the GATT system gradually grew more legalistic and

professional, but it remained formally non-binding.71
The GATT dispute resolution system worked remarkably well in its early years because
compliance with the system was the norm due to “the homogeneity of the initial contracting
parties and the consensus in support of the GATT rules.”72

In the 1950s and 1960s, however, as

more states became Contracting Parties, this policy cohesion faltered, and the “decision-making
process became more cumbersome.”73
The GATT dispute resolution system had a number of features that, over time, proved
problematic. The allegedly noncomplying state had a right of veto at virtually every step of the

67

JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 95; see Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 393.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 95; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 393-94.
69
Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 393-94.
70
Id.
71
For a general description of the various modifications in panel procedures that have been implemented since 1955,
see JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 23, at 61-65.
72
Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 108; see Robert E. Hudec, supra note 39, at 190.
73
Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 108; see Hudec, supra note 39, at 193.
68
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process, from the appointment of a panel, to the decision to adopt a panel report, and to a
decision to authorize trade sanctions in response to noncompliance.74

Moreover, there were no

set time periods for the various states of the process, giving the defending state the ability to
delay the proceedings.75
Most importantly, because the GATT system relied heavily on consensus76 in rendering
decisions, those states against which complaints were filed could readily obstruct the process and
make enforcement of any panel recommendations virtually non-existent. 77

The consensus

requirement for adopting panel decisions meant that one party could block the decision by voting
against it.

Therefore, the losing state could effectively veto any legal effect of the

recommendation.

Consequently, only one panel decision resulted in the authorization of

retaliation by the Contracting Parties in the entire history of the GATT.78

Even in this case,

which came from a complaint by the Netherlands against the United States, 79 political
considerations forestalled application of the authorized retaliation, and the initial trade violation
continued unabated. 80

Another political outcome of the consensus requirement was that

74

DUNOFF, supra note 5, at 781.
Id.
76
The concept of consensus was never formally defined under the GATT. It retains characteristics similar to
unanimity in that any state member present has a veto authority. Consensus is unaffected by abstentions or absence.
Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 12
J. INT'L ARB. 81, 105-06 (1995).
77
Roberts, supra note 12, at 516.
78
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 96; Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 17, at
365.
79
In 1953, the Netherlands raised a complaint about U.S. restraints on imported dairy products. The Contracting
Parties authorized the Netherlands to retaliate by limiting U.S. grain imports. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 24, at 96.
80
Id.
75
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countries “occasionally withheld approval of a panel report in retaliation for some country’s
unwillingness to allow adoption of a panel report favorable to the first country.”81
In response to the growing ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution system, states relied
increasingly on unilateral threats and trade sanctions to resolve their trade-related differences.82
The United States was particularly eager to resort to unilateral measures.83

The use of section

301 as a unilateral trade weapon84 against foreign governments and industries outside the legal
framework of the GATT upset many U.S. trading partners85 and became a major issue in the
Uruguay Round.86

As it became clear that section 301 was a target for foreign trade negotiators,

Congress announced that the weak GATT dispute resolution system made section 301 a necessity
and that no revisions of section 301 could be expected unless there were major changes in the
dispute resolution process.87

Thus, when the Contracting Parties met in the mid-1980s to

overhaul the international trade system, the growing impotence of the GATT dispute resolution
process was a major issue to be solved.88

81

Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW.
389, 402 (1995).
82
Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 398-99.
83
Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 844-45.
84
Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 394, 397 (1990)
(calling § 301 the “Schwarzenegger of U.S. Trade Law”).
85
Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 41, 44-5
(1994) (noting that Europeans were especially upset because nearly one quarter of all section 301 cases had been
aimed at Europe).
86
Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 130-31, 134-36.
87
Alan O. Sykes, “Mandatory Retaliation” for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic
Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 301, 324 (1990).
88
Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 848.
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B. The World Trade Organization

The next major step in the development of international trade regulation was the creation of
the WTO.

This subpart of the thesis sets forth the history of the WTO and, in particular, the

improvements made to the process of resolving international trade disputes.
1. Formation of the WTO
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which commenced in 1986, was an attempt to
make the international trade system more efficient.

The procedures that had arisen around the

GATT were proved unworkable in a number of areas, including dispute resolution, as discussed
above. In addition, the GATT failed to cover several important areas of world trade, including
services and intellectual property.89

The Contracting Parties felt that the time had finally come

to establish a new international trade organization to integrate and oversee world trade.
The Uruguay Round resulted in the formation of the WTO, which officially came into
existence on January 1, 1995.90

The WTO was formed to be more than just the successor to the

GATT in that it was intended to supersede and encompass the GATT, as well as all the
subsequent trade negotiations and procedures. The preamble to the WTO Charter states that the
participating states are resolved “to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past
trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

89

WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 8. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, the GATT provisions regarding agriculture
went largely unheeded by the Contracting Parties. Id.
90
WTO Charter, supra note 1, art. I; Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 380 n.1.
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Negotiations.”91

Accompanying the creation of the WTO were a series of renegotiated trade

agreements, including an updated version of the GATT known as GATT 1994.92
2. WTO Dispute Resolution
The system for resolving international trade disputes underwent major changes as a result of
the Uruguay Round. The WTO Charter contains the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes93 which provides the proper dispute resolution procedures
in much greater detail than the GATT.94

The Understanding makes six important modifications

to the system for resolving trade disputes. When viewed together, these changes show that the
new WTO system is much more powerful and authoritative to resolve disputes than the GATT
system.95
The first major change was the creation of a single entity, the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), to oversee all trade disputes.96

As a result, all dispute settlement procedures under the

GATT, the Subsidies Code, and a variety of other trade-related agreements are now brought
under the DSB.97

Because the GATT lacked such an overarching commission, there was an

opportunity for parties to forum-shop for the particular dispute resolution mechanism that best

91

WTO Charter, supra note 1, Preamble.
Id. at 1140.
93
Understanding, supra note 9.
94
Id. (listing the new WTO procedures in great detail) with GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII (providing merely
cursory explanation of the GATT procedures).
95
Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2286.
96
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 2. The DSB is composed of representatives from every state that has signed the
treaty or code at issue. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 848 n.89.
97
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 1126.
92
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suited their objectives.98

The formation of the DSB ends the potential for forum-shipping and

reduces the threat of inconsistent decisions.
A second modification made by the Understanding is the creation of an appellate procedure.
In a clear attempt to make the dispute resolution system more consistent, fair, and effective, the
Understanding gives parties the right to appeal panel decisions to the Appellate Body.99

The

Appellate Body is a permanent, seven-member trade court that oversees the work of all dispute
resolution panels, regardless of the treaty or code that is the subject of the dispute.100
Third, the Understanding repairs a major weakness of the GATT system by making
adoption of the panel and Appellate Body decisions virtually automatic. Adoption of a decision
can only be forestalled if all the member states, including the winning state, agree by consensus
not to adopt it.101

Under the GATT, the losing party alone could single-handedly derail a panel

decision by voting against it.

In sharp contrast to the old GATT system, however, a WTO panel

decision “shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) unless a party to the dispute
formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal to the WTO Appellate Body or the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”102

Also, once the Appellate Body has issued its

opinion, the decision is binding unless the Dispute Settlement Body votes unanimously to
overrule it.103

Thus, under the WTO, the winning party can rescue a decision by voting for it.104

98

Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 848; Patricia Kalla, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the
1980s: Where Do We Go from Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT’L L. 82, 92 (1986) (noting that former GATT practice involved
procedures under six disparate dispute mechanisms adopted by nine codes at the Tokyo Round)..
99
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 17.
100
Id. art. 17(1)-(2).
101
Id. arts. 16(4), 17(14).
102
Id. art. 16(4), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1235.
103
Id. art. 17(14), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1237 (“An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and
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A fourth change made by the Understanding is the imposition of time limits on the process.
Under the GATT, the dispute resolution system was open-ended and panels often deliberated in
numerous sessions during a period of months.105

The Understanding imposes strict time limits

on the disputants,106 the panel,107 the Appellate Body,108 and the DSB109 at every stage of the
proceedings, and encourages those involved to discharge their duties promptly.110
Under the GATT system, delays were often attributable to disagreements in the formation of
the panel. The consensus requirement “delayed the establishment [of the panel] while the
parties engaged in meaningless semantic struggles over whether anyone had a right to the
establishment of a panel and the precise remit of the panel.”111

The Understanding reverses the

power balance by requiring consensus to delay the formation of a panel once the complaining
state has requested one.112

Thus, under the WTO system, another delay tactic is eliminated

since panel formation is virtually automatic.
Fifth, the Understanding gives teeth to the dispute resolution system by formalizing
enforcement procedures.113

Under the GATT, the most that the Contracting Parties could do

unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate Body report . . . .”).
104
Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 850.
105
Nichols, GATT Doctrine, supra note 28, at 396.
106
Understanding, supra note 9, arts. 12(5)-(6), 15(1)-(3).
107
Id. arts. 12(3), 12(8)-(9), 21(5).
108
Id. art. 17(5).
109
Id. arts. 20, 21(4).
110
Id. art. 4(9) (encouraging parties to accelerate proceedings in cases of urgency).
111
Young, supra note 81, at 402.
112
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 6(1).
113
Id. art. 22; see also Young, supra note 81, at 404-05 (noting that under the WTO system, “the offending party is
eventually told in no uncertain terms that it is to accept all [the WTO's] rulings and decisions”).
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was authorize the aggrieved state to retaliate against the violator state.114

A state with sufficient

political and economic power could easily ignore this retaliation and continue the prohibited
practices. 115

By adding guiding principles on the means of enforcement, however,

enforcement under the Understanding can either take the form of compensation for the harm
caused by the violator state or withdrawal of trade concessions made by the affected state.116
Finally, the drafters of the Understanding addressed the problem of unilateral retaliatory
action.

Article 23, entitled “Strengthening of the Multilateral System,” prohibits all members

from “mak[ing] a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has
been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding.”117

This prohibition solidifies the authoritative and exclusive

position of the WTO in trade dispute resolution.118
Viewed together, these changes reflect the desire of the WTO member states to remove
political influences from trade dispute resolution and encourage greater predictability and
fairness in the application of trade agreements.119

114
115
116
117
118
119

GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(2).
This is essentially what happened in the United States-Netherlands dispute of 1953. See supra note 73.
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 22; Young, supra note 81, at 404.
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 23(2)(a).
See Young, supra note 81, at 400-01.
Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2288.
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III. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM

The role of private parties in international dispute resolution has been the subject of debate
among commentators for many years.

After summarizing the philosophical debate over the

nature of dispute resolution, this part shows that the WTO dispute resolution system has moved
from power-oriented dispute resolution toward a rule oriented one. This part concludes that
greater private participation in the WTO dispute resolution process is necessary to advance the
rule-oriented reform of the WTO.

A. Power vs. Rule

Since the inception of the GATT, there has been a debate over the appropriate nature of
international trade regulation and dispute resolution. Although commentators have expressed a
wide spectrum of views on this issue, a general distinction can be made between those who
prefer a “power-oriented” or “pragmatist” approach and those who prefer a “rule-oriented” or
“legalist” approach.120

120

The concepts of power-oriented and rule-oriented diplomacy were first developed by Professor Jackson. See
John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98 (1978)
[hereinafter Jackson, Crumbling Institutions]. The terms “pragmatist” and “legalist” were first used in this context
by Professor Trimble, see Trimble, supra note 47, at 1017, and later by numerous commentators, e.g., Montana i
Mora, supra note 29, at 109; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 833.
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Pragmatists believe that the goal of international trade dispute resolution should be merely
to provide a forum for states to resolve disputes among themselves in whichever way they see
fit.121

They argue that the primary purpose of the dispute resolution system should be to end the

dispute as soon as possible by encouraging negotiations, consultations, and appropriate political
compromises.122

Under this view, the system would encourage compromises even if they are in

contravention of the rules and agreements governing the trade practices in question.123
The pragmatist view comes from the idea that trade-related diplomacy should be poweroriented rather than rule-oriented.124

In power-oriented diplomacy, it is the relative power of

the parties that determines the resolution of the dispute and not any predetermined set of rules.125
Under this system, “[a] small country would hesitate to challenge a large one on whom its trade
depends.

Implicit or explicit threats . . . would be a major part of the technique employed.”126

The legalists, on the other hand, take the view that the goal of trade dispute resolution
should be to preserve the integrity of the applicable rules.127

The benefit of this approach is that

it encourages predictability and stability in international trade practices.128

121

They argue that

Young, supra note 81, at 390.
OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 71 (1985); Trimble,
supra note 47, at 1017.
123
Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 110-11.
124
Id. at 109.
125
Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 98-99.
126
John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT,
13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter Jackson, Governmental Disputes].
127
See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93; Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120,
at 99.
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Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 129; Trimble, supra note 47, at 1017-18; Young, supra note 81, at 390.
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private parties and governments could more adequately “plan economic decisions and thereby
maximize efficiency” if trade conditions are predictable.129
In a rule-oriented system, the resolution of a dispute would be based on adherence to a
prescribed set of rules to which the parties have already agreed.130

Any disagreements that arise

concerning the application of the rules are resolved by an impartial third party or by some other
unbiased, predetermined process.131

In contrast to the power- oriented approach, the rule-

oriented approach gives no significance to the relative power of the states in dispute.132

B. The Trend Toward the Rule-Oriented Approach

The evolution of world trade dispute resolution in this century represents a shift from a
power-oriented approach (i.e., pragmatism) to a rule-oriented approach (i.e., legalism).133

The

two major movements toward a rule-oriented approach have been the Bretton Woods Conference,
including the subsequent development of the GATT, and the recent creation of the WTO.
The states participating in the Bretton Woods Conference and the drafters of the GATT were
trying to create a reliable, integral set of rules that would govern world trade.134

Had the ITO

come into existence, it would have contained an elaborate dispute resolution system unlike any
other international dispute resolution system.135
129

Because the GATT was intended merely as a

Trimble, supra note 47, at 1017.
Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 99.
131
Jackson, Governmental Disputes, supra note 126, at 4.
132
See Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 98-99.
133
Professor Jackson argues more broadly that the entire “history of civilization may be described as a gradual
evolution from a power oriented approach, in the state of nature, toward a rule oriented approach” and that “modern
western democracies ... have passed far along the scale toward a rule oriented approach.” Id. at 99.
134
See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 93.
135
Id.; Young, supra note 81, at 392-93.
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preliminary agreement to regulate world trade until the ITO took over, it did not contain detailed
dispute resolution provisions.136

In the early years of the GATT, however, the Contracting

Parties developed procedures, such as the practice of appointing an impartial panel to review the
dispute and make a recommendation that reflected an acceptance of a rule-oriented approach.137
The following decades, however, were marked by a breakdown of the dispute resolution
system and a retreat into power-based diplomacy.138

The birth defects of the GATT began to

manifest themselves as political influences crept into the dispute resolution process.139

This

politicization of the system undermined the integrity of the GATT rules and made the power of
the parties a primary factor in the outcome of trade disputes.140
One major goal of the Uruguay Round was to improve the increasingly ineffectual dispute
resolution system by inhibiting the parties’ ability to use their political and economic power to
circumvent the rules.141

The new dispute resolution system under the WTO represents a major

shift toward a legalist approach and away from the power-based diplomacy that pervaded the
GATT system.142
For example, the creation of the DSB to oversee all disputes accords with the legalist idea
of an impartial final arbiter. The addition of an appellate procedure shows that the member
states were putting more emphasis on the adequacy and quality of rule interpretation and less on

136

Young, supra note 81, at 391-92.
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Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 845.
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137

24

the swift resolution of the dispute. This focus on rule integrity illustrates the member states’
strong legalist view.

The provision of strict time limits, the automatic adoption of panel

decisions, the prohibition of unilateral action, and the heightened enforcement measures limit the
ability of large states to use their power to delay, derail, or circumvent the dispute resolution
system.

Taken together, these changes make the WTO dispute resolution system look much

more like a courtroom than like a negotiating table.

C. The Advantages of the Rule-Oriented Approach

This increasing emphasis on adherence to a prescribed set of rules in international trade
dispute resolution is a desirable trend that should continue in the future. Perhaps the primary
benefit of such an approach is that it makes global trade practices more predictable and therefore
encourages international investment and trade. 143

One of the goals of the WTO dispute

resolution system is to “provid[e] security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system.”144

A power-oriented system, by definition, produces different outcomes based on the

power balance of the states in dispute.145

The resulting uncertainty would make private parties

justifiably hesitant to invest their capital and effort into international trade.
The pragmatists’ emphasis on merely resolving each dispute as quickly as possible146 is too
shortsighted and would actually lead to more international disputes.

A reliance on the power of

the respective states encourages large states to use their economic and political power to reap
143
144
145
146

See Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 178.
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 3(2).
Young, supra note 81, at 390, 401.
See Long, supra note 122, at 71.
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benefits in contravention of the rules. Such a system would encourage, and maybe even ensure,
future disputes.147

A rule-oriented approach, on the other hand, encourages adherence to the

rules, giving strong states no incentive to try to circumvent them.148
A further benefit of a rule-oriented approach is that it will foster more amicable
international relations. A system that relies on a state’s power encourages a state to exercise its
power.”149

The international acrimony that resulted from the United States’ use of unilateral

actions in the decades preceding the WTO illustrates the deleterious effects that a power-oriented
system can have.150
Indeed, the trend toward rule-oriented approach, both in international trade and in other
contexts, may be an inevitable result of the global rise of democracy. As national power shifts
from entrenched governmental decision-makers to private citizens, the power of states is
increasingly divided among competing domestic constituencies.151

With a state’s power thus

decentralized, it can less successfully be used as the primary bargaining chip in international
relations.

Therefore, a power-oriented approach “becomes more difficult if not impossible.”152

Of course, the trend toward legalism is not without criticism. One concern is that a strong,
rule-based international trade regime will limit states’ ability to structure their own domestic laws.
147

David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at A1.
(noting that the United States' attempt to resolve this dispute by invoking a “national security exemption” will
probably lead to future disputes over the use of such an exemption by other states).
148
See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 112 (“[I]t is not the resolution of the specific dispute
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149
Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 100.
150
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 25; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 844-45.
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See Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 120, at 100 (describing how the growth of democracy
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It has been argued that the domestic laws of every state reflect the political and societal values of
that state, and that imposing a superseding international law undermines these values in the name
of free trade. 153

This argument, however, overlooks the role that each state’s domestic

processes played in determining whether that state would enter into the WTO.

The result of the

Uruguay Round was merely the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.154

To

obtain the benefits afforded by WTO membership, and the corresponding restraints, states
needed to approve the Charter through their domestic ratification processes.155

The political

and societal values already came into play when each state decided to join the WTO.
Furthermore, the WTO Charter was drafted by governmental representatives who presumably
tried to infuse their respective national values into the Charter and the trade agreements that
accompanied it.

D. The Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Resolution

Like other dispute settlement systems, the purpose of the WTO dispute resolution system is
to achieve WTO objectives as a whole.156

The WTO dispute resolution system, therefore,

cannot be estimated without considering whether it serves to maximize the objectives of the

153

Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 2, at 299. Professor Nichols recommends that the WTO adopt an
exception under which “laws primarily codifying an underlying societal value and only incidentally hindering free
trade should not be subject to World Trade Organization scrutiny.” Id. at 301.
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WTO.

One of the WTO objectives is the promotion of trade among all states by increasing the

production of goods and services and the incomes and opportunities of individuals.157
The movement toward a legal approach in international trade dispute resolution has been
based on separating political influences and motives from dispute resolution.

A primary benefit

of such an approach is that it allows private parties to more accurately predict future trade
conditions, thus allowing them to maximize the value of their resources by participating in
international trade.

To achieve this objective, private parties should be allowed to participate in

the dispute resolution system in a manner that will enable them to protect their interests.
Of course, there are objections that the expansion of standing hurts some constituency of a
member state, causes unequal treatment between private parties, and most seriously, might cause
the WTO to be unable to pursue the goal of free trade because states tend to keep their control on
international trade.158

These objections, however, overlooks the benefits that private party

participation will bring to the WTO and international trade. Allowing private parties to bring
actions against state members, however, would greatly improve the ability of the WTO dispute
resolution system to serve WTO objectives.
These objections, however, overlooks the benefits that private party participation will bring
to the WTO and international trade.

Allowing private parties to bring actions against state

157

The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
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Agreement, Preamble.
158
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Standing In World Trade Organization Disputes To Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996).
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members, however, would greatly improve the ability of the WTO dispute resolution system to
serve WTO objectives.
1. The “Political Capture” Theory
Private party access to the WTO can prevent the problem of political capture.

The capture

theory posits an organization run by individuals who try to maximize their own interests instead
of interests of the organization.159

In the context of a domestic organization, the members

attempt to maximize a private, rather than public, utility function.160

In the case of the WTO, it

is run by states which might sacrifice private parties’ interest to maximize their own interests.
For example, the United States might be hesitant to raise a claim against Japanese import
restrictions on cars, or even to express negative view of these restrictions because the United
States must consider its own interest such as diplomacy and international relations. Thus, so
long as it is only states that are parties to the WTO, the only interests that can be adequately
represented and reflected are those of states which may conflict with the objectives of the
WTO.161

On the other hand, private participation in international organizations can help break

the cycle of state interest perpetuated by political capture. In her article addressing individual
rights in international trade organizations, Andrea Schneider discusses the link between domestic
politics and international trade:

159

Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in International Trade Dispute
Resolution Really Give Private Organizations A Voice in the WTO?, 12 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 427, 431, n.17 (Fall 1999).
(“Take, for example, the hazardous waste industry. High-level EPA regulators and other officials leave government
positions and find high-level jobs in the same industry that they had been responsible for regulating.”).
160
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161
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The involvement of private actors in the dispute resolution mechanisms of trade
organizations has the ability to reduce the linkage between trade and domestic political
interests. While theoretically this link allows governments to be more responsive to their
citizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics keeps governments tethered to
special and well-organized interest groups. Once a state has determined that it is in its
national interest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted under that
organization, the link to domestic political interests can be reduced by giving private actors
standing to enforce the agreement. In that way governments will be responsible for
following the rules across the board rather than selectively.162
Thus, private participation in the WTO dispute resolution system can help improve state
accountability to the companies and individuals who conduct international trade. In contrast,
the lack of private access to the WTO leads to political capture at the international level.
Giving private parties the rights to bring cases, rather than requiring them to lobby or petition
their government to takes action, will eliminate the problems of political capture at the dispute
resolution stages.
2. Democracy Deficit
According to the theory of democracy deficit, as power is centralized in an organization or
government, and as increasing numbers of laws are passed, individuals have less ability to
influence the actions of the organization or government.163

At the WTO, the lack of access for

private parties to dispute resolution mechanisms may be more appropriately termed, “democracy
absence.”164

Indeed, the lack of any legitimate participation in the WTO holds corporations,

NGO’s and public interest groups at a great disadvantage in contrast to the ability of states to

162

Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade
Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 587, 594 (1998).
163
Id. at 591.
164
Laidhold, supra note 159, at 432.

30

influence trade policies. This problem is compounded at the WTO because the agreements and
procedures of the WTO have a major impact on the daily operations of the business
community.165
Like any organization, the WTO’s continued validity and relevance is dependent on the
support of those who are intended to benefit - in this case, private parties.166

If private parties

are denied sufficient access to the dispute resolution system, then the WTO will lose its
legitimacy as the final arbiter of international trade and its decisions will be rendered
powerless.167
Democracy deficit is exacerbated at the WTO in the absence of private party participation.
Most of the time, and in most states, member governments of the WTO make a concerted effort
to adequately represent private parties before the WTO. 168

In the same way, however, a

member government to the WTO may choose not to represent any interests other than its own.
Democracy deficit is problematic both with respect to state accountability and to the conduct of
international trade among private parties.

A state’s capacity to act at will and subject its trade

policies to political, rather than economic, environmental and other concerns lessens the

165

See Montana i Mora, supra note 29, at 162 (describing the profound impact that international treaties in general,
and GATT specifically, have on individuals and businesses).
166
See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 351 (1996) (arguing that “a closed dispute resolution process will undermine popular
support”).
167
See Young, supra note 81, at 408 (“[P]eople are more likely to accept adverse political decisions if those
decisions are made by political institutions they consider legitimate.”).
168
South Korea brought an action before the WTO on behalf of South Korean producers of DRAMS (Dynamic
Random Access Memory chips) including Hyundai Electronics Industries and LG Semicon , See WTO Panel Report,
United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on DRAMs of One Megabit or Above From Korea, WT/DS99/R.(Jan. 29,
1999); The United States brought an action before the WTO on behalf of U.S. banana growers including Chiquita
Brands Int'l, Inc, See EU - Bananas, supra note 20.
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effectiveness or applicability of the WTO.169

Those problems can be solved when the WTO

allows private parties to use its dispute resolution system.170
3. Transparency
Transparency is important in international system because “clear rules set forth how the
system is going to work and create confidence on the part of users of the system.”171

It

encourages the parties to the dispute to use the system more often by making the rules and
procedures clear, providing precedent and possible persuasive authority for other dispute
resolution through published decisions, and increasing the predictability of the system. 172
Through transparency, the international community observes that the result was achieved in a
just manner. 173

A low level of transparency exists if rules and procedures are not well-

established in advance of a dispute.
system is set forth.”174

In that case, “resolution is left up to the parties, and no

On the other hand, a high level of transparency is achieved when

procedures and decisions of a system are published regularly to create a high level of
predictability.175

169

Schleyer, supra note 8, at 2294. (“For example, if the United States is in delicate trade negotiations with Japan,
the United States might be hesitant to raise a claim against Japanese import restrictions on, say, cars, or even to
express a negative view of these restrictions. If Ford or General Motors can be the instigator or primary proponent of
the claim, the problem will be addressed without the United States having to take the political heat. Certainly, the
political complications … would not be so severe or troubling if the claim was raised by a private party instead of
another government.”).
170
Id.
171
Schneider, supra note 162, at 614.
172
Id. at 613.
173
Roberts, supra note 12, at 541.
174
Id. at 615.
175
Id. at 616.
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Although the WTO has made great progress toward achieving predictability and
transparency through the establishment of the DSU and regularly published decisions, there is
nevertheless an inherent problem in its transparency potential.176

Transparency includes not

only the right to be informed, but also the right to inform and participate in the adjudicative
process.177

“Clearly, both the right to inform and to be informed [and thus to participate in the

adjudicative process] are both important aspects of transparency.” 178

Therefore, true

transparency in the WTO cannot be achieved without private participation in the dispute
resolution system.

By denying private participation in its dispute resolution system, the WTO

lacks transparency because private parties in the form of individuals, corporations and NGOs can
never be sure of a position that a state will endorse before the WTO.

176
177
178

Id.
Laidhold, supra note 159, at 433.
P. Clark & P. Morrison, Key Procedural Issues: Transparency, 32 INT'L LAW. 851, 857 (1998).
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IV. THE INADEQUACY OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM

Despite its rule-oriented reform, the WTO has not opened the dispute resolution system to
private parties, leaving international trade matters in sovereign states and looking at the flow of
goods as occurring between these states.179

Under the current WTO Dispute Resolution System,

private actors are involved only to the extent that they lobby their governments to represent their
interests and to protect their industries.180

Private participation in the WTO dispute resolution

system is now a little bit broadened by the WTO Appellate Body, which asserted the right of
member states to include private, non-governmental employees in their trade delegations before
the WTO,181 and acknowledged the right of private individuals or organizations to submit
amicus briefs in support of their positions in international trade disputes.182

This part will

analyze whether the degree of private party participation available at the current WTO dispute
resolution system is adequate enough for private parties to protect their interests without the
ability to raise a claim before WTO dispute resolution system.

179

R. Bruno, Access of Private Parties to International Dispute Settlement: A Comparative Analysis, 148-49 (1995)
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Harvard University).
180
For Example, the United State negotiated with Japan to open its automobile market. See Schneider, supra note
162, at 603.
181
See EU-Bananas, supra note 20.
182
See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, at 15-22 (holding that amicus briefs may now be sent directly to the WTO
without attachment to members' submissions).
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A. Use of Domestic Influence

Currently, private parties who want to challenge a trade practice of another state must try to
use their domestic influence to get their government to raise the claim.

The private party can

persuade its government to raise the claim through informal means such as voting or lobbying.
In addition, the United States has instituted formal procedures by which citizens can petition the
government to respond to another state’s trade violation.
1. Informal Methods
Where a dispute resolution process is available only to states, private parties can force their
government to bring their claim to the WTO dispute resolution system by lobbying or using their
political power.

For example, the real economic actors in the dispute in the mid-1990s between

the United State and Japan over access to Japan’s market for film products were film
manufactures Kodak and Fuji.183

Kodak successfully lobbied the U.S. government to raise the

claim before the WTO and both companies worked side by side with their governments during
the entire WTO dispute settlement process.184
Although member governments of the WTO try to adequately represent private parties
before the WTO, there are many reasons why a state might neglect to raise a valid claim on
behalf of private parties. For example, a state “might not want to repeat [a private party’s] point
if doing so could undermine the government in another WTO case or in domestic litigation.”185
183
184
185

DUNOFF, supra note 5 at 216.
Id.
Charnovitz, supra note 166, at 353.

35

In addition, every state has constituents with varying interests, and the government cannot
possibly represent all of their interests, no matter how well-intentioned and responsive it is.186
Furthermore, a state’s responsiveness to its constituents will be balanced against its desire to
maintain amicable relations with its trading partners, especially those with significant political
and economic power.187

For this reason a state will inevitably bring fewer claims than some of

its constituents would like.

This political, power-oriented influence on the dispute resolution

system undermines the WTO’s goals of predictability and stability in world trade.
Some commentators argue that private standing before the WTO is unnecessary because
most countries that are important to international trade are responsive to the needs of their
citizens.188

According to the commentators, “democratic governments do function to fairly

assess, evaluate, and coordinate various societal values and goals” and that “[t]his is true of trade
policy as well.”189
A distinction, however, must be made between the formation of trade policy and the
effective implementation of policy once it is formed.

With respect to the former, a government

plays the essential role in balancing societal, political, and economic values.

Dispute resolution,

however, involves the latter, and a consideration of competing values, as opposed to an emphasis
on the rules, would undermine the predictability that the WTO seeks to achieve.

186

Id. at 342 (noting that “many national governments fail to represent the interests of even a majority of their
constituencies as periodically reflected by low approval ratings.”).
187
See Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 901. Professor Shell also notes the “free rider problems” that arise
in this context. He observes that the benefits of eliminating a prohibited trade practice accrue to all states, while the
diplomatic fallout is confined to the state that brings the claim. Therefore, states will be hesitant to raise a claim,
even where doing so would be a net benefit to world trade as a whole. Id. at 901-02.
188
Trimble, supra note 47, at 1025.
189
Nichols, Extension of Standing, supra note 2, at 311-12.
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2. Formal Methods: Section 301
The United States’ section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 301”) establishes formal
procedures by which private parties can petition their government to take action in response to
the alleged trade infractions of another state.190 This procedure could conceivably be used to
expand private participation in the WTO dispute resolution system, and thus need to be examined
in closer detail to evaluate its adequacy and feasibility.
Under Section 301, a citizen may petition the U.S. Trade Representative to take action
against a foreign state’s trade practices.191

After an investigation, the Trade Representative will

decide whether the trade practice in question is violating any trade agreement, and, if so, what
measures should be taken.192

When the United States has retaliated, it has usually been in the

form of heightened tariffs or other restrictions on imports.193
Section 301 is clearly power-oriented and has produced all of the negative effects that are
associated with the use of power-oriented negotiation tactics.

While Section 301 actions have

been highly successful in the past, they have soured relations between the United States and its
trading partners and have even inspired retaliation against the United States.194

The animosity

toward the United States that unilateral measures can produce cautions against continued use of
Section 301 to resolve trade disputes.
190

19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994).
19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
192
Id. §§ 2411-2420; A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section
301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 678-79 (1996).
193
RICHARD O. CUNNINGHAM & CLINT N. SMITH, SECTION 301 AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 581, 583.
194
WTO Charter, supra note 1, at 25; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 844-45.
191
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Section 301 does, in an individual case, give private parties some measure of control and
input into world trade. This access, however, comes at too high a cost.

The continued use of

Section 301 would be a reversion to the power-oriented diplomacy of the past and would
undermine the U.S.-supported efforts of the WTO to make the system fairer and more
predictable.195
In addition to being unwise, continued use of Section 301 is also unlikely.

The United

States government’s liberal use of Section 301 actions was primarily a reaction to the inefficacy
of the GATT dispute resolution system.196

Now that the system has been improved under the

WTO, the United States is not as likely to find it necessary to resort to unilateral action under
Section 301.197
Another reason why Section 301 is an inadequate method for private parties to protect their
rights is that there is no guarantee that the U.S. Trade Representative will take action, even if the
complaint is valid.
procedure.198

The government retains broad discretion at every step of a Section 301

The same political motivations that could prevent a government from raising the

claims of its constituents could discourage the United States from actively pursuing a Section
301 petition.

195

See Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 192, at 688-89; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 899.
Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 192, at 687; Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 843-44.
197
Puckett & Reynolds, supra note 192, at 689; TERENCE P. STEWART, THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT:
AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES AND POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS, IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 29, 33 (Terence
P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafter STEWART, TROUBLE SPOTS].
198
CUNNINGHAM & SMITH, supra note 193, at 603-04; see Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over
Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 233, 246
n.61 (1996).
196
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The strongest argument against the use of Section 301, however, is that it almost certainly
would be in violation of the Understanding.

Article 23(2) of the Understanding forbids states

from taking unilateral action, and even from “mak[ing] a determination to the effect that a
violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute
settlement.”199

It is hard to envision any explanation for the use of Section 301 that does not

come into conflict with this prohibition.
The Understanding’s repudiation of unilateral measures is in conflict, however, with the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the “URAA”),200 the U.S. statute adopting the WTO Charter.
The URAA specifically states that Congress did not intend the WTO Charter to invalidate
Section 301.201

It is difficult to reconcile this provision of the URAA with Article 23.

Such

discrepancies between domestic laws and the Understanding are covered by Article 16(4) of the
WTO Charter, which requires each member to “ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.” 202
Based on this provision, it is likely that any continued use of Section 301 will be a violation of
U.S. obligations under the WTO Charter.203

199
200
201
202
203

Understanding, supra note 9, art. 23(2)(a); see STEWART, TROUBLE SPOTS, supra note 197, at 33-34.
19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1994).
See id. § 3512(a)(2)(B); CUNNINGHAM & SMITH, supra note 193, at 591.
WTO Charter, supra note 1, art. XVI(4).
See STEWART, TROUBLE SPOTS, supra note 197, at 33-34.
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B. WTO Appellate Body Decisions regarding Private Party Participation in
Dispute Resolution

The WTO Appellate Body has handed down two decisions addressing private access to
dispute resolution. In the EU–Bananas case,204 where amongst other things, the Appellate
Body considered Saint Lucia’s right to be represented by private rather than government counsel.
The Saint Lucia’s argument was based on the principle of customary international law that a
sovereign’s right to decide whom it may accredit as officials and members of its delegation
cannot be limited.

The Appellate Body ruling in the EU-Bananas case permitted government

representation by private counsel in oral hearings before the Appellate Body.
Another case to be considered is the United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
Products in 1998, which led the WTO Appellate Body to address the procedural issue of private
or non-member organization’s submission in briefs in WTO proceedings.205

The Appellate

Body ruled that attaching a brief or other material to the submission of either appellant or
appellee, no matter how or where such material may have originated, renders that material at
least prima facie valid and an integral part of that participant’s submission.

The amicus briefs

submitted by three groups of NGOs as an appendix to the United States submission, were
admitted notwithstanding the fact the appended briefs contained legal arguments different from
those submitted by the United States.

204
205

See EU-Bananas, supra note 20.
See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21.
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1. Private Counsel Representation
The issue of private counsel representation of WTO member governments came to a head
when the Bananas Panel decided not to admit Christopher Parlin, a private lawyer representing
Saint Lucia, to the panel proceedings.206

In its first substantive meeting with the parties on

September 10, 1996, the Panel ruled that the private counsel seeking to represent Saint Lucia was
not entitled to attend the Panel’s meetings in the case.207
The Panel ruling with respect to denying representation by private counsel was not
specifically appealed to the Appellate Body.208

Nevertheless, in July 1997, the government of

Saint Lucia submitted a letter to the Appellate Body, requesting the participation of its two nongovernmental legal advisers.209
On July 15, 1997, the Appellate Body granted Saint Lucia’s request. The Appellate Body
stated that there was nothing in the WTO agreement, the DSU, the Working Procedures, nor in
customary international law or the prevailing practice of international tribunals which (1)
prevents a WTO member from composing its own delegation to an Appellate Body proceeding,
and (2) specifies who can represent a government in making its representations before the
Appellate Body.210

The Appellate Body also noted that, in the interest of member governments’

representation by qualified counsel in Appellate Body proceedings, “representation by counsel of

206

WTO Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC - Bananas Panel Report].
207
Id.
208
Id.; See also Understanding, supra note 9, Note that Saint Lucia is a third party to the case and that pursuant to
Articles 16.4 and 17.4 of the DSU, only parties to a dispute, and not third parties, may appeal a Panel Report.
209
See EU-Bananas, supra note 20, ¶ 5.
210
See id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
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a government’s own choice may well be a matter of particular significance - especially for
developing-country Members - to enable them to participate fully in dispute settlement
proceedings.”211
The Appellate Body ruling in the EU-Bananas case expressly permits governmental
representation by private counsel in oral hearings before the Appellate Body. Although the
Appellate Body noted that the peculiar legal nature of its own proceedings, which permit the
participation of private counsel, do not apply as fully at the panel level,212 at least two panel
decisions since the EU-Bananas case have reportedly allowed private counsel to participate in
oral hearings.213

Thus, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have both recognized the futility,

in the resolution of modern international trade disputes, of maintaining strictly governmentemployed delegations. Therefore, it is now possible for private parties to represent their cases
before the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body if their governments agree to raise the claim and
to choose them as the representatives of the governments.
Private counsel representation would improve the WTO dispute resolution system. First,
private counsel representation will make the WTO dispute resolution system more legitimate and
effective by responding to the needs of actual players in international trade.

Because the actual

parties in interest are the ones most affected by the outcome of the dispute settlement proceeding,
it makes some sense to allow their counsel to take part in the process.214
211

Second, private

See id. ¶ 12.
Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 1205 (1998).
213
See WTO Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO doc.
WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) ¶ 4.1.
214
“[T]he WTO should lead to new areas of practice development for the private bar. U.S. lawyers should
increasingly assist, lobby and shadow governments as to positions taken in WTO-based disputes ... since such
212
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counsel representation can prevent WTO member governments from sacrificing certain issues for
the sake of their long-term trade strategy. Finally, private counsel representation can solve
inequity problem among WTO member governments by helping small countries utilize the WTO
dispute resolution system. Therefore, contributions that private counsel representation will bring
to the WTO dispute resolution system cannot be underestimated.
Permitting private counsel to represent a WTO member government, however, is not
enough to adequately protect private parties’ interests.

Private counsel representation before the

DSB is just a reaffirmation of the national sovereignty of WTO members to select their own
delegates because “it is up to individual government to decide whether to include private sector
counsel in their delegation to the WTO.”215

Thus, for private parties to have a voice before the

DSB, their government must agree not only to raise a claim on behalf of the private parties, but
also to include the private parties in the government’s representatives to the DSB.

As

mentioned above, however, there are several factors that dissuade WTO member states from
pursing the interests of private parties before the WTO dispute resolution system.

Private

parties that are being harmed by illicit trade practices cannot protect their interests if their
governments, for political reasons, refuse to raise the claims in the first place or to choose private
sector counsels as the representatives.

disputes ultimately affect 'the real parties in interest' - i.e., the lawyers' corporate clients ...” Gregory Shaffer, The
WTO: The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L.
767, 768 (Oct. 1997).
215
Jessica C. Pearlman, Participation by Private Counsel in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
Proceeding, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 399, 414 (Winter, 1999).
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2. Private Parties’ Submission of Amicus Briefs to the WTO
In United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products in 1998, the
WTO Appellate Body addressed the procedural issue of private or nonmember organizations’
submission of briefs in WTO proceedings.216

Despite the absence of mechanisms for private

party submission of briefs to the WTO, three groups of NGOs submitted briefs to the Panel in the
Shrimp-Turtle decision in the hopes that their positions would influence the Panel.217

The Panel

found that the acceptance of non-requested information from non-governmental sources were
incompatible with the provisions of the DSU.218

Article 13(1) of the DSU provides:

Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such
information or advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it
shall inform the authorities of that Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully
to any request by a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and
appropriate.219
The Panel in Shrimp-Turtles interpreted Article 13.2 to mean that additional information is
appropriately submitted to a Panel only if the Panel expressly solicits it.220

216

In the Shrimp-Turtles decision, the WTO Appellate Body upheld an earlier WTO Panel decision that requiring
the U.S. to bring its import practices with respect to shrimp into conformity with WTO obligations. The Appellate
Body held that the U.S. Public Law 101-162, Section 609, which prohibited the importation of shrimp caught in nets
that do not employ turtle-excluder devices, or TED's, was a violation of the introduction, or chapeau, of Article XX,
See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21.
217
The three NGO groups were: (1) The World Wide Fund for Nature, and the Foundation for International
Environmental Law and Development, (2) the Center for International Environmental Law, the Center for Marine
Conservation, the Environmental Foundation Ltd., the Mangrove Action Project, the Philippine Ecological Network,
Red Nacional de Accion Ecologica, and Sobrevivencia and (3) the Earth Island Institute, the Humane Society, and
the Sierra Club. Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 79.
218
Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 8.
219
Understanding, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
220
Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 9.
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The Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s interpretation.221

It held that “attaching a brief or

other material to the submission of either an appellant or appellee, no matter how or where such
material may have originated, renders that material at least prima facie valid and an integral part
of that participant’s submission.”222

The Appellate Body admitted the amicus briefs submitted

by the three groups of NGOs as an appendix to the United States’ submission, although the
appended briefs contained legal arguments differing from those submitted by the United States.
Under the Appellate Body holding, a Panel still retains the right to disregard or reject an
amicus brief filed by a private party unless the amicus brief is adopted by the member state.
The Panel does not, however, have the right to disregard the brief solely on the grounds that it
was not submitted by a member.

Thus, WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies retain the right,

under the decision in the Shrimp-Turtles case, to accept or reject information provided by private
parties.

Information, in the form of amicus briefs from a private party, may still be submitted to

a WTO Panel or Appellate Body as an appendix to a member’s submission.

Shrimp-Turtles

also held that private parties may submit amicus briefs directly to a Panel or the Appellate
Body.223

If a private party’s amicus brief is expressly adopted by a member to be a part of that

members’ submission, however, a panel would be under an obligation to consider its

221

See id. ¶ 89.
Id.
223
The language of the Appellate Body decision has been interpreted to imply that any individual or interest group
can now submit an amicus brief directly to a WTO panel, although the panel would have the discretion to disregard
it. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21; see also James Cameron, WTO Opens Disputes to Private Voices, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 7, 1998, at B5.
222
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arguments.224 Otherwise, private party access to the WTO, in the absence of a member’s
endorsement, remains discretionary with the Panel or Appellate Body receiving the information.
There are many potential advantages that unsolicited amicus brief submissions by private
parties will bring to the WTO.

As discussed above, a democracy deficit is perpetuated by a

WTO system that strictly adheres to government-to-government dispute resolution.

One of the

advantages to private parties’ brief submissions, therefore, is the potential to reduce the amount
of the democracy deficit in the resolution of international trade disputes.225

This is especially

true when a member state is reluctant to make an argument on behalf of private parties because
the private parties can submit directly to the WTO.

Also, allowing a nongovernmental entity to

make written presentations to WTO panels would lead to better informed, more enlightened
panel decisions because private interests that may not be represented by the private entity’s state
may now be heard by the WTO.226

Finally, transparency in dispute settlement is promoted by

insuring that all arguments in a dispute are considered. Transparency can be improved if
corporations and NGOs know that their arguments and positions have a chance to be considered
during trade disputes. Increased transparency is thus promoted by a direct avenue for private
parties’ brief submission to the WTO.
Notwithstanding the benefits of direct brief submission by private parties, the ShrimpTurtles decision is not enough to protect private parties’ interests.227

224

First, the decision leaves

See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 21, ¶ 89.
Laidhold, supra note 159, at 442.
226
See Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 45, at 908 (arguing that excluding private parties from WTO dispute
resolution will “silenc[e] them insofar as they might contribute to wiser, more contextual decision-making”).
227
See Cameron, supra note 223, at B5.
225
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WTO Panels and the Appellate Body with the discretion to accept or reject the arguments
contained in amicus briefs unless such information is expressly adopted by the member attaching
the brief.

Thus, private parties’ interests could still be disregarded by the WTO Panels and the

Appellate Body.

Second, the Shrimp-Turtles decision could lead to aggressive lobbying efforts

by private organizations to influence a WTO member state in a trade dispute to expressly adopt
the organization’s arguments.228

Moreover, private organizations may also turn their energies

toward lobbying other WTO members to join in a trade dispute as a third-party participant.

As

a third-party participant, a member could effectively represent the legal arguments of an
organization.

Lobbying efforts conducted by private organizations could become burdensome

and counterproductive to the point of clogging a member’s ability to represent national interests
before the WTO.

Third, and most importantly, the private parties’ rights to summit amicus

briefs comes too late in the process to adequately protect the interests of private parties.
Nongovernmental entities that are being harmed by illicit trade practices will still be denied relief
if their governments, for political reasons, refuse to raise a claim in the first place. Therefore,
the ability to file amicus briefs provides insufficient protection for private parties engaged in
international trade.

228

Id.
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V. PRIVATE PARTY STANDING BEFORE THE WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM

Once the idea that private participation in the WTO dispute resolution system is desirable is
accepted, the appropriate level of participation should be determined.

Although the WTO

Appellate Body decisions have expanded private participation in the WTO dispute resolution
system, the interests of private parties cannot be adequately protected without allowing private
parties to raise claims to the WTO.

Thus private party standing to initiate the WTO dispute

resolution proceeding should be granted.

This part provides a comparative analysis of the

dispute resolution systems which have been set up and which operate in the context international
treaties, international organizations, or both, and which grant standing to private parties. Then,
this part examines which mechanism is most desirable and workable to the WTO dispute
resolution system.
The following forums has been indicated by proponents of private standing before the WTO
as international dispute settlement mechanisms which provide access and remedy for individuals
and private entities: the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),229 the Nordic
Convention on the Protection of the Environment (the “Nordic Convention”), 230 the

229

See Charnovitz, supra note 166, at 349; Young, supra note 81, at 406 & n.77.
Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Swed., 1092 U.N.T.S.
279 [hereinafter Nordic Convention].

230
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International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the “ICSID”);231 the International
Labor Organization (the “ILO”);232 and the European Convention on Human Rights.233

In

order to determine the proper threshold for standing before the WTO, it will be helpful to
examine the methods used by these tribunals.

A. Use of Domestic Court System

Nations have provided private parties with the ability to enforce an international agreement
by expressly linking the rights of individuals to the domestic court systems of the participating
states.

The two primary examples of this approach are the antidumping and countervailing

duties provisions of NAFTA234 and the Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment,
which allows private parties to protect their interests in their domestic courts.235
NAFTA, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, contains dispute resolution provisions
to serve both states and private parties. 236

Chapter XIX of NAFTA creates a binding,

supranational arbitration scheme accessible directly by private business parties237 through which
businesses may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions of domestic trade
regulators.238 NAFTA offers parties who wish to appeal anti-dumping and countervailing duty
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233
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234
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, arts. 1901-1911, at 68287. (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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Nordic Convention, supra note 230.
236
See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 407, 431 (1993).
237
Both private parties and states have access to this process. NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1904(5), 32 I.L.M. at
683.
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NAFTA, supra note 234, art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. at 683-84.
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decisions issued by national regulatory authorities a choice of appellate procedures. Aggrieved
parties may either use the regular domestic system of judicial review of the country that issued
the decision or request that a binational NAFTA arbitration panel hearS their appeal.239

These

arbitration panels, which are directed by the treaty to apply the domestic law of the state that
issued the anti-dumping or countervailing duty decision,240 provide the final decision on such
allegedly unfair trade claims.241

Even though private parties can raise a claim before a NAFTA

panel instead of their domestic courts,242 standing is still linked to the domestic laws of the
importing state.

Specifically, private parties are guaranteed the same right that they possess

under domestic law to challenge the prohibited activities.243
Similarly, the Nordic Convention “grants individuals, groups, and non-governmental
organizations access to a legal system under international law . . . treating such persons as
members of a community by giving expression to their concerns, interests, and rights.”244

Thus,

the Nordic Convention gives “[a]ny person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance
caused by environmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State” the right to bring suit

239

See Id.
If the parties elect to use an article 19 panel, the panel will apply the substantive national law and standard of
judicial review of the importing state that has issued the contested ruling. Id. art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683. Article
19 panels consist of five arbitrators, a majority of whom must be lawyers. Id. Annex 1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
241
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review process,” id. art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
242
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Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 232 (1995). This applies only to
antidumping disputes. In all other areas, only countries can initiate the dispute settlement process. NAFTA, supra
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in the offending state’s courts.245

Under this arrangement, there is no separate international

tribunal, but merely an agreement that each state will entertain suits from nationals of other
countries to the same extent that they allow suits from their own citizens.
The use of domestic courts in international arena, however, is not only detrimental to the
interests of private parties, 246 but also unworkable and undesirable for the WTO dispute
resolution system.

NAFTA and the Nordic Convention include only three or four countries and

only apply to a specific area of the law.

In such a context, the danger of inconsistent application

of the law, while not totally absent, is much less significant than it would be in the WTO, which
covers over a hundred different countries247 and regulates a broad spectrum of trade practices.
If a similar mechanism was used for the WTO, the domestic courts of dozens of states would be
simultaneously interpreting and applying WTO agreements.

The resulting lack of uniformity in

the application of trade laws would undermine the ability of private parties to reliably anticipate
future trade practices. One major improvement of the WTO dispute resolution system over the
GATT was the elimination of multiple forums for resolving disputes.

A system that ties private-

party standing to the domestic laws of each state would negate this benefit.

Moreover, allowing

each state’s domestic law to define the standing requirements for the WTO would cause private
access to be susceptible to politically-motivated limitations because each state could limit private
party participation by limiting domestic judicial review of international trade decisions.
245
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246
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247
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B. Private Party Standing to the Equity Holders

The ICSID and the ILO both provide some nongovernmental entities with standing to
initiate disputes.

Upon closer inspection, however, the nature of these entities serves to limit

standing in a way that renders them inapposite to the WTO.
Unlike the WTO, which is an organization of states, the ICSID deals with international
investment between private foreign investors and governments.

As a forum of international

dispute resolution, however, the ICSID acknowledges all actors operating within its system.
Despite its structural difference from the WTO, the ICSID dispute resolution is worth of
comparison to the WTO dispute resolution system in that it applies equally applies to all parties
who participate in the field of international investment.248
The ICSID, established through the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,

249

is a legal framework that protects and

promotes the flow of foreign investment between developed and developing countries. 250
Unlike the WTO, the ICSID permits private parties to participate with states in settling disputes
and making policy.

Once parties consent to arbitration under the ICSID Convention , the

ICSID permits private parties to sue states and obtain binding arbitration awards that the
domestic courts of the defendant states are obligated to enforce.251

248
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extends to “disputes between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State
arising directly out of an investment-related agreement, provided both parties have consented in
writing to submit such a dispute to the Centre.”252

Therefore, the ICSID provides a neutral

forum for arbitrating investment disputes between foreign investors and host countries.253
The ICSID, however, grants an investor a right to arbitration only if the initial investment
agreement between the investor and the host country explicitly provides for ICSID arbitration.254
Essentially, states are in no way compelled to use ICSID arbitration.255

Furthermore, the ICSID

Convention allows states to remove entire classes of disputes from ICSID jurisdiction.256

Thus,

the ICSID does not raise serious standing concerns in that a state must expressly grant an
investor permission to sue the state. Such a system would be unworkable in the context of the
WTO.

Requiring states to explicitly consent to suit before the WTO for each individual case

would lead to inequitable enforcement of trade agreements.

Larger states could use their

political and economic power to refuse to consent, while less developed states would be
effectively forced to consent in order to attract more capital.257

This power-based outcome

would gradually weaken the predictability that the WTO has sought to achieve.

252
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The ILO is the primary international organization concerned with protecting the rights of
workers around the world.258

Its primary function is to establish labor standards and monitor

international compliance with these standards. 259

Under the ILO Constitution, workers’

organizations can raise “representations of non- observance” against states alleged to be in
violation of the required labor standards.260

Individual workers cannot bring complaints, and a

complaint from a workers’ organization is only considered if this organization is deemed by the
ILO to be authentic.261
The approach taken by the ILO dispute resolution system is inapplicable to the WTO.
Extending standing to workers’ organizations is not as drastic as extending it to individuals and
corporations.

Also, workers’ organizations will be subject to the same political influences that

states are and may be hesitant to file some claims in order to protect their relationship with the
offending state.

In order for private parties to adequately protect their interest in free trade with

a minimum of political interference, the WTO needs to make standing available at the individual
level, not the organizational level.

C. Private Party Standing to the Entity that Suffers Harm

The harm of a state’s protectionist trade practices is borne by the private parties which are
doing business with that state.

In order for these private parties to be confident that illicit trade

258

Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced
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practices will be corrected with sufficient speed and reliability, the WTO dispute resolution
system needs to be available to them. In other areas of international law, private parties have
standing to raise claims before international tribunals when they have suffered prospective or
actual harm.

An analysis of the various standing levels of these tribunals will be helpful in

determining the proper standing levels for the WTO.
1. Standing for Prospective Harm
The European Convention on Human Rights262 allows standing for private parties who
have not suffered actual harm, but for whom injury is imminent or prospective.

The European

Convention on Human Rights, which most European states have ratified, contains certain
guarantees of basic human rights. An individual who has been a victim of a violation of these
rights can file a claim with the European Commission of Human Rights.263
individual must have been directly affected by the violation.264

In order to sue, the

For the purposes of standing,

the Commission has expanded the definition of “victim” to include a potential or eventual
victim.265
In the context of the WTO, allowing private parties to raise claims for prospective injuries
would be too broad.

Such a standard would allow everyone who could potentially do business

in a state to attack that state’s trade practices. Standing for prospective injury is possible for the

262
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European Union because the states of the European Union has given up much more of their
autonomy than the states of the world would be willing to give up to the WTO.266

It is clear

that a similar standard for the WTO would represent a serious intrusion into the autonomy of the
WTO member states. Moreover, human rights violation should be treated differently from the
violation of trade agreements.

Human rights violation will normally be irreversible; in contrast,

economic harm, such as that resulting from restrictive trade practices, is rectifiable, so there is no
danger in requiring private parties to actually suffer harm before raising a claim before the
WTO.267
2. Standing Limited to Those Actually Harmed
Standing for private parties, therefore, should be limited to those who have suffered actual
harm due to a state’s allegedly illicit trade practices.

This standard is used in the dispute

resolution system provided in the investment provisions of NAFTA.
Chapter XI of NAFTA provides guidelines to ensure fair treatment of foreign investors.268
If a state-sanctioned monopoly or state enterprise acts in contravention of chapter XI, then
foreign investors can force the offending state into arbitration.269

An investor has standing to

raise a claim only if the investor has actually incurred some form of loss or damage by reason of
the alleged breach.270

266
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269
270
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or damage because the statute of limitations for filing a complaint starts when the investor knows
or should have known that the loss occurred.271
This same standard should be adopted by the WTO as the threshold for private-party claims.
Allowing private parties to bring actions against state members would greatly improve the ability
of the WTO dispute resolution system to fulfill WTO objectives.

Standing, however, should be

limited to those who have suffered economic loss as a result of behavior by state members
contrary to the standards set under the WTO agreements.

This standard would permit private

parties to challenge trade practices that are actually inhibiting free trade, while keeping frivolous
claims from the WTO dispute resolution system. Also, it ensures that the parties will be
diligent in pursuing their claims.

271

Id. art. 1116(2), at 643.
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VI. CONCLUSION

An international system that includes state, corporate, organizational and individual actors
and that relies solely on states to bring and enforce the laws of the treaty has a legitimacy
problem.

It is especially true in the context of international trade where private individuals

rather than states are the primary actors.
Notwithstanding the rule-oriented reform of the WTO, there are many improvements that
can be made to the WTO dispute resolution system so that dispute resolution adequately
accomplishes the goals set forth for the treaty.

The WTO system is imperfect because of the

large gap between state and private interests. The lack of standing for private parties to bring
suit before the WTO means that either there are many potential international trade dispute claims
that are never resolved, or private interests already before the WTO are not heard.
Private counsel representation and submission of amicus brief by private parties
acknowledge that WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies are realizing the efficacy of private
interests in international trade matters.

In the context of private counsel representation, the

WTO acknowledges both the sovereignty of member states and the importance of stretching
trade representation beyond national boundaries.

In the context of private parties’ brief

submissions, the WTO has recognized the value of non-state arguments in trade disputes.

The

WTO has even permitted private parties’ brief submission directly to a WTO Panel or Appellate
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Body.

WTO tribunals nevertheless retain the power to accept or reject any or all private parties’

arguments that are not expressly adopted by a member state.
These changes, however, are not sufficient for private parties to protect their interests unless
the ability to initiate dispute before the WTO is granted to private parties without the aid of a
member state.

As long as private parties have to rely on their governments to initiate and

advance trade disputes, they will be uncertain about the future enforcement of trade agreements
and will therefore be hesitant to take full advantage of the benefits of free trade.
It is true that there must be structural changes to the WTO dispute resolution system for
private parties to have a voice at the WTO.272

It is also true, however, that if states are actually

committed to the trade treaties and to bringing the benefits of those treaties to their constituents,
they must allow their own citizens to bring cases directly to the dispute resolution mechanism
established under the treaty. Among many available ways of private participation in the WTO
dispute resolution system, granting private parties standing before the WTO is the only way for
private parties to protect their interests and for the WTO to fulfill its objectives. Standing,
however, should be strictly limited to those parties that have suffered actual harm to reduce the
number of frivolous suits and ensure diligence of the parties in pursuing their claims.

272
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